practice, crafting multiple claims, investing in high quality claims and disclosures, conducting a careful prior art search, and also by monitoring the activities of firm 2. We assume a constant marginal and average cost of refinement, .
In stage two, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose development investments, x 1 and x 2 .
We assume a constant marginal and average cost of development, i . In stage three, the firms decide whether to dispute infringement and if so, they then decide whether to enter a license agreement or file a lawsuit.
We assume the firms hold symmetric information throughout the game. Between stages two and three, the firms observe the probability that firm 1 could win an infringement suit against firm 2. At the earlier stages the firms know that is distributed over [0, 1] according to the distribution function F( ; P 1 , x 2 ). We assume that P 1 and x 2 induce shifts of F that satisfy first order stochastic dominance. It is natural to assume that P 1 and x 2 influence the distribution . A patent dispute only arises when firm 2 adopts a technology that arguably falls within the scope of at least one of firm 1's patents. Firm 1 can improve its prospect at trial by investing more in patent refinement which shifts the distribution to the right, and firm 2 can affect its prospect at trial through its development investment. Possibly, firm 2 increases its exposure to a lawsuit by increasing it development investment; alternatively, firm 2 might reduce the probability of a successful suit by developing around the claim language in firm 1's patents, or by hiding its infringement. For now, we leave open the possibility that x 2 shifts the distribution either right or left.
In stage three, there are four possible outcomes:
1. Firm 2 observes and decides to abandon its newly adopted technology ("deterrence"). Firm 1 gets a monopoly payoff M(x 1 ) and firm 2 gets zero.
2. Firm 2 does not abandon the technology, but firm 1 does not assert its patent ("acquiescence"). The firms get duopoly profits D 1 (x 1 ) and D 2 (x 2 ) respectively.
3. Firm 1 asserts its patents and the firms bargain to a settlement. The payoffs are Nash bargaining solutions, S 1 and S 2 . Let ( , x 1 , x 2 ) denote the joint profit from settlement, ( , x 1 , x 2 ) = S 1 + S 2 . Development investments could spill-over to raise the joint profit from settlement, but in the basic model we assume they have idiosyncratic value to the investor.
4. If bargaining breaks down, the firms litigate with payoffs L 1 ( , x 1 ) and L 2 ( , x 2 ). Firm Naturally, the litigation payoffs depend on the probability that the patentee wins the lawsuit. We also allow the settlement payoffs to depend on this probability, because the rigor of antitrust regulation of patent licenses depends on the strength of the threatened patent suit. At one extreme, simple prosecution of a patent lawsuit can lead to antitrust liability if the suit is baseless. Given our assumptions we have unique solutions such that, 0 < A < L < D < 1. 
III. Patent Refinement and Development Investment
At stage one when firm 1 makes patent investments and at stage two when firms 1 and 2 make simultaneous development investments, they believe the strength of a potential patent lawsuit by 1 against 2 has a probability distribution F( ; P 1 ; x 2 ). The firms look ahead to stage three using F to calculate the expected payoffs given acquiescence, settlement, litigation or deterrence. The expected profit for each firm is:
(1)
Recall V i ( ) denotes the profit to firm i at stage 3, marginal cost of development is denoted i δ , and marginal cost of patent refinement is denoted . The analysis in our working paper provides conditions on F sufficient to guarantee a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which x 1 and x 2 are strategic substitutes.
Acquiesce region Bessen and Meurer (2005) . Consider two randomly selected firms.
What determines the probability that one will file a lawsuit against the other? The probability of litigation is λ = F( D ; P 1 , x 2 ) -F( L ; P 1 , x 2 ). Referring to Figure 1 , this is the portion of the distribution F that falls between L and D . Generally, two sorts of effects will influence this probability: factors that move L and D , and factors that shift F.
Since our empirical investigation, unlike previous empirical studies, controls for the characteristics of both parties in the suits, it suffices to look at direct effects on the probability of litigation. These effects are (letting f be the probability density function): If the industry is such that additional R&D investment allows firms to earn large additional profits (e.g., patent rents), then R&D investment will lead to greater gains from litigation, shifting L to the left (firm 1 would rather sue than settle). All else equal, a patent holder who invests more in R&D in such an industry will be more likely to sue. We find evidence that R&D spending by patent holders in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries-where patent rents are high-increases the probability of suit, but not in other industries, where patent appropriability is not so high. When we control for firm profits (actually, firm market value) to control L , this effect becomes insignificant in all industries, consistent with the theoretical model. Shifts in the distribution F provide another margin of influence. We assume that the probability distribution is massed to the left, at low values of α. This assumption is motivated by the observation that technologies are diverse and that most pairs of randomly chosen firms will have very different technologies, unlikely to infringe each other's patents. In the empirical paper we construct a measure of technological distance and find support for this assumption.
This means that if, say, P 1 shifts the distribution to the right, then this will increase the probability of litigation-more mass will fall between L and D . 4 Since greater patent refinement-more patents, better quality patents, better monitoring, etc.-should shift F to the right, this is exactly the relationship we should expect, and we do, indeed, find that firms with larger portfolios are more likely to sue, all else equal.
Similarly, firm 2's R&D spending, x 2 , may also shift the distribution, but this effect could be positive or negative. If firm 2 uses development investment mainly to "invent around" patents or aid piracy, then probability mass is shifted to the left out of the litigation interval-with this sort of infringement avoidance, firm 2 would be less likely to be found to infringe. Alternatively, if increasing firm 2's development investment exposes it to greater risk of inadvertent infringement, then probability mass is shifted to the right into the litigation interval. When we include firm profits (market value) in the regression to control for L and D , we find a strong positive effect of firm 2's R&D on the probability of litigation. This suggests that most defendants are inadvertent infringers rather than pirates or firms attempting to cheat by inventing around.
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The distribution of trial outcome probabilities is affected not only by the endogenous patenting and development choices of the firms, but also by a variety of exogenous factors of interest to us. This framework can also be used to think about policy changes. For example, relaxed antitrust rules increase the attractiveness of settlement, shifting L to the right, while reduced litigation cost and larger rents increase the attractiveness of litigation, moving it left.
Similarly, legal changes that expand the scope of patent rights or make patent boundaries less clear would shift the distribution F to the right.
V. Conclusion: Vague Property Rights, Patent Disputes, and Patent Lawsuits
In an ideal (though not necessarily optimal) patent system in which validity and scope are clear, potential patent lawsuits would result in either a certain win or a certain loss for the patent owner. Then there would not be any patent disputes or lawsuits filed. 6 Innovative firms would seek an ex ante license or avoid adopting patented technology. And patent owning firms would have no incentive to make strategic investments in patent refinement. The distribution of F would be bi-modal, falling entirely within the acquiescence and deterrence regions.
In contrast, in our model the vagueness of patent rights leaves firms unsure about the strength of a potential patent lawsuit. In equilibrium, there are patent disputes, i.e., ex post settlement and litigation, when the realization of falls into the interval [ A , D ), and there are (observable) lawsuits filed when falls into the interval ( F , D ).
Our model provides a framework for analyzing patent law changes affecting the certainty of patent rights. In the early 1980s, all patent appeals were consolidated in the newly created Federal Circuit. One goal of this change was to increase the clarity of patent rights. In the mid 1990s, patent claim construction was moved from juries to judges; again, one goal of this change was to increase the clarity of patent rights.
Clearly, if these reforms succeeded, then we should observe a reduction in lawsuits. More subtly, the model also provides a framework for predicting the effect of these reforms on the profit, development investment, and patenting behavior of innovative firms. We plan to investigate these effects in future work, and we hope to learn whether patent vagueness is a substantial impediment to innovative activities.
